Pricing and ordering decisions of recyclables under a sustainable supply chain management: A game-theoretic approach

Document Type : Article


Industrial Engineering Group, Golpayegan College of Engineering, Isfahan University of Technology, Golpayegan 87717-67498, Iran


Recently, sustainable development concept has attracted a great attention in many countries. Recycling plays a major role in sustainability by improving the waste management systems. In this study, pricing and ordering decisions of a recyclable waste are considered under a sustainable supply chain containing one collector, one separator, and one recycler. In this setting, the game-theoretic frameworks including Nash and Stackelberg models are developed to set the decisions. Finally, the obtained decisions are discussed and some results are provided. It is found that different interactions established among the members do not affect the collector’s decisions. From the recycler’s view, the Stackelberg game with lower prices is more preferable. It is more beneficial for the members to be established the Stackelberg game among them. The members achieve more profits by making strategies that reduce the self-price or enhance the cross-price sensitivities of the demands. Moreover, from the sustainable development perspective, the Stackelberg framework is better than the Nash structure by collecting and recycling more waste.


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