Government subsidies in manufacturing and remanufacturing with consumer segment and heterogeneous demand

Document Type : Article

Authors

1 - College of Transport and Communications, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai 201306, China. - Antai College of Economics and Management, Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai, China

2 School of Economics and Management, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai 201306, China

3 College of Transport and Communications, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai 201306, China

Abstract

Waste products have double properties of environmental hazard and resource recovery, while recycling behavior has greater positive external effect of economic, which often results in the low enthusiasm for enterprises to engage in remanufactured activity. For price decisions on whether government subsidizes closed-loop supply chain or not, Stackelberg game model were constructed under three scenarios: none is subsidized (Model N), subsidize to manufacturer (Model M) and subsidized to recycler (Model R) to obtain the optimal government subsidy and price decision, as well as analyze the difference among the equilibriums of four scenarios. From the conclusion, we can find that the government subsidy improve the social welfare, as well as the government implement different subsidy policies based on the needs for economic and social progress.

Keywords

References

References:
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Scientia Iranica
Volume 28, Issue 3 - Serial Number 3
Transactions on Industrial Engineering (E)
May and June 2021
Pages 1817-1829

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