Sharif University of Technology Scientia Iranica 1026-3098 30 2 2023 04 01 Stackelberg models in a two-level supply chain with imperfect quality items and allowable shortage 642 659 22156 10.24200/sci.2021.51648.2292 EN R. Yadav Apaji Institute of Mathematics and Applied Computer Technology, Banasthali University, Rajasthan, 304022, India S. Pareek Apaji Institute of Mathematics and Applied Computer Technology, Banasthali University, Rajasthan, 304022, India M. Mittal Department of Computer Science Engineering, Amity School of Engineering and Technology, Bijwasan, New Delhi, India Journal Article 2019 03 02 Application of an absolute supply chain model does not invalidate the possibility of few defective items in a supplied lot, therefore it becomes essential to conduct an inspection process for segregating the defective items, subsequently such segregated items are sold at discounted price. Shortages mainly occur with sudden demand or erratic production capacity, and player’s decisions are influenced by it. In this paper, the shortage is considered as a seller’s decision variable and demand is receptive to selling price and marketing expenditure of the buyer. Player’s interaction will be reviewed and determined as non-cooperative Stackelberg game. Further, a supply chain model is endured to substantiate the interaction and democracy among buyer and seller in the supply chain and is pitched by non-cooperative game theoretical approaches. The Stackelberg game approach is used in the non-cooperative method where one player acts as leader and another as follower. Hereafter, unanimous numerical examples along with sensitivity analysis are exhibited to compare amidst two different models with and without shortages to demonstrate the significance of the paper. https://scientiairanica.sharif.edu/article_22156_2b946f7ce4397501b165d3c2b058ab8e.pdf